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Abstract
On July 1, 2004, the Seoul Metropolitan Government introduced a wide range
of reforms to its public transport system: it completely reorganized bus services,
installed Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) corridors, improved coordination of bus and metro
services, and fully integrated the fare structure and ticketing system between routes
as well as modes. This article describes the public transport reforms in Seoul and
assesses their impacts on safety, speed, costs, passenger levels, and overall customer
satisfaction.

Introduction
Problems can sometimes generate solutions that yield long-term beneﬁts. That
appears to be the case in Seoul, Korea, where congestion, air pollution, traﬃc injuries, and increasingly serious funding shortages have forced government oﬃcials
to introduce a range of innovative transport programs. Most recently, the acute
funding crisis of Seoul’s public transport system has prompted a complete reexamination of ways to improve service quality while keeping costs and subsidies
aﬀordable.
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This article examines the public transport reforms introduced in Seoul in July 2004
and reports on their impacts over the ﬁrst few months. The reforms increased
public control of bus services and reorganized the entire bus system into four
divisions. The restructured bus system now includes a network of Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) routes scheduled to expand greatly in the coming years. Thanks to the
reforms, bus services are now much better coordinated with each other and with
Seoul’s extensive metro rail system, both in their physical interchanges and in fare
structures and ticketing procedures. We describe these and other complementary
changes in transport policies intended to improve the performance of Seoul’s public transport system. First, however, we provide a brief overview of the transport
situation in Seoul, and in particular, public transport developments over the past
few decades.

Impacts of Population and Economic Growth on Travel Demand
Seoul has been one of the fastest growing cities in the world. Indeed, the Greater
Seoul metropolitan area quadrupled in population between 1960 and 2002 (Korea
National Statistical Oﬃce 2005). With more than 22 million residents, it is now
one of the world’s largest and fastest growing megacities. More people obviously
generate more trips and more overall travel demand. In addition, however, rapid
economic growth has yet further stimulated travel. In constant, inﬂation-adjusted
2004 US dollars, per-capita income in South Korea rose from only $311 in 1970
to $2,044 in 1980, $7,378 in 1990, and $12,531 in 2002 (Korea National Statistical Oﬃce 2005; see Figure 1). That represents a 40-fold increase in real per-capita
income in only 32 years. Such dramatic economic growth generates large increases
in both freight and passenger transport. It also makes private cars more aﬀordable.
While only a tiny percentage of Koreans owned cars in 1970 (2 cars per 1,000 persons), the rate of car ownership rose to 215 per 1,000 persons by 2003 (Ministry of
Construction and Transportation 2003; see Figure 1).
Increased use of private cars has caused serious traﬃc congestion, especially on the
radial arterial highways connecting the suburbs to the central city. Average roadway speeds are only 20 km per hour overall, and only 17 km per hour in the city’s
two central business districts (Kwon 2004; Kyung 2004). Such congested roads
slowed down buses even more than cars and greatly impaired overall bus service
quality. Increased car use has also caused dangerously high levels of air pollution,
noise, and traﬃc accidents as well as excessive use of scarce land for roadways and
parking facilities (Ahn and Ohn 2001; Hwang 2001; Kim and Jung 2001).
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Figure 1. Increases in Car Ownership Paralleling Growth in
Real Per-Capita Income in South Korea, 1970–2002
(in constant, inﬂation-adjusted 2004 US dollars)

Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation 2003; Korea National Statistical Oﬃce 2005.

Reliance on Metro System to Solve Transport Problems
Until 1974, Seoul was almost entirely dependent on bus services. Sharply rising
roadway congestion, reduced bus speeds, higher passenger volumes, and longer
trip distances increased the necessity for an urban rail system (Hwang 2001). Seoul
constructed its ﬁrst metro line in 1974. From the modest 8 km of that initial line,
the Seoul metro rail network has expanded to a total of 487 km in 2004, with 13
lines and 389 stations. Indeed, the urban and suburban rail network in Greater
Seoul is now one of the largest in the world and carries 8.4 million passengers per
day—more than twice the daily passenger volumes on the New York subways and
the London underground (Kim and Rim 2000; Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit
Corporation 2005).
While the construction of Seoul’s metro system has been an impressive accomplishment, it has come at high cost. The cumulative construction debt has now
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reached almost $6 billion and represents 80 percent of the city’s total debt.
Moreover, passenger fares only cover about 75 percent of operating costs, with
the remaining 25 percent subsidized through various programs by the city government. The annual operating deﬁcit in 2003 was $634 million. Financing both
construction costs and operating deﬁcits has put an enormous ﬁnancial burden
on the city. Although the central Korean government had provided fairly generous ﬁnancing (40% to 50%) of metro construction costs, the rising funding needs
have become overwhelming. Thus, the central government has sharply restricted
its funding for any new or extended metro lines—increasing the ﬁnancial burden
for the Seoul Metropolitan Government, which is already deeply in debt (Lee, C.
1999; Lee, J. 2003; Hwang 2002; Seoul Development Institute 2003b).
In short, both central and local government oﬃcials have been seeking more
aﬀordable ways to expand urban public transport services to meet the rising travel
demands of a growing megacity. That ﬁnancial pressure to seek cost-eﬀective
alternatives to metro expansion was the main impetus to the far-reaching reforms
of Seoul’s public transport system introduced in July 2004. As described below, the
main strategy was to rely more heavily on lower-cost bus services but to greatly
enhance their speed, connectivity, comfort, and overall attractiveness. Such quality improvement was desperately overdue, as described below.

Bus Service in Seoul Before 2004 Reforms
The ﬁrst public bus services in Seoul began in 1953 and remained the principal
mode of public transport until the mid-1990s. Bus usage rose rapidly with the
growth of Seoul in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, but began a long-term decline
around 1985. Bus services lost both overall market share as well as total passengers
(see Figures 2 and 3). Buses had to compete with ever-expanding metro services as
well as rising car ownership. Just as buses were faced with increased competition
from metros and cars, bus services declined in quality due to roadway congestion
that slowed down buses and made them less dependable. They also suﬀered from
highly ineﬃcient, uncoordinated, and dangerous operating practices of the many
private bus companies who ran the services (Kim and Rim 2000; Hwang 2001).
For decades, bus services in Seoul were operated by a large number of private
ﬁrms, with virtually no government control of routes, schedules, or other aspects
of service. Only the fares were determined by the Seoul Metropolitan Government,
which also provided increasing operating subsidies to cover growing operating
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Figure 2. Trends in Modal Shares of Total Trips in Seoul, 1980–2002
(percent of trips by each type of transport)

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2004; Seoul Development Institute 2003a.

Figure 3. Trends in Bus, Metro, and Taxi Passengers in Seoul, 1980–2002
(millions of passenger trips)

Source: Ministry of Construction and Transportation 2003.
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deﬁcits that were causing many ﬁrms to go bankrupt or curtail the quality of their
services. Each bus company operated diﬀerent routes, with no competition on
any particular route. Because there was no coordination among the diﬀerent bus
companies, many routes were highly circuitous, overlapping, and not adequately
integrated with metro services and the routes of other bus companies.
Most of the private bus ﬁrms sought only to maximize proﬁts (or minimize
losses) while disregarding rider safety and comfort. Thus, an oﬃcial report of the
Seoul Metropolitan Government sharply criticized the private bus companies for
encouraging truly outrageous bus driving behavior (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2004). To squeeze as many passengers as possible into a bus, bus drivers
slammed on their brakes or suddenly and repetitively braked to jolt standing passengers further back into the bus. Bus drivers would recklessly race other buses
to pick up passengers waiting at bus stops, but they deliberately avoided picking
up elderly or disabled passengers to save time. In addition, bus vehicles were old,
poorly maintained, and did not meet international standards. Service was dangerous, slow, uncomfortable, and unreliable.
As shown in Figure 4, the number of bus companies has fallen considerably in
recent years, from 89 in 1995 to 58 in 2002 (Seoul Development Institute 2003b).

Figure 4. Numbers of Bus Companies, Registered Buses, and Passengers

Source: Seoul Development Institute 2003b.
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To some extent, the decline was due to some ﬁrms going bankrupt. But the Seoul
Metropolitan Government had also encouraged the consolidation of bus ﬁrms
to eliminate duplication, reduce overhead costs, and improve coordination of
services. That did not, however, solve the increasingly serious ﬁnancial problems
of the bus companies. As bus passengers continued to decline, there were fewer
passengers per bus, less fare revenue per bus, and escalating operating deﬁcits. For
example, the average number of total daily passengers per bus fell from 1,093 in
1989 to only 494 in 2002 (Korea Transport Institute 2005).
The local government subsidy required to keep private bus services running rose
from only $9 million in 1999 to $110 million in 2002. Although bus services covered a higher percentage of operating costs from passenger fares than metro services (85% vs. 75% in 2003), the sharply rising subsidy needs of bus services became
a grave concern. The increasing subsidy burden of bus services was especially
problematic on top of the enormous funding problems for metro services (Seoul
Development Institute 2003a, 2003b).
The main problem, however, was sharply declining bus service quality over the past
two decades, which drove away many bus passengers and encouraged more car
use, congestion, and pollution. Although it did not deal with the core problem of
unregulated, uncoordinated private bus ﬁrms until 2004, the Seoul Metropolitan
Government made several attempts over the past two decades to speed up bus
services and thus increase bus usage. To protect buses from worsening roadway
congestion, the ﬁrst curbside bus lanes were installed in 1984 and expanded to 89
km by 1993, 174 km by 1994, and 219 km by 2003 (Kim and Rim 2000; Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005c). The network of reserved bus lanes helped speed up
bus travel somewhat, but it did not succeed in raising bus use. Clearly, more drastic
changes were necessary.

Planning and Implementing Bus Reforms in Seoul
The new city mayor, Myung-Bak Lee, and the Seoul Development Institute (SDI)
were crucial in researching, developing, and implementing far-reaching reforms
of Seoul’s public transport system. Prior to becoming mayor, Lee had been the
chief executive oﬃcer of Korea’s largest corporation (the Hyundai Engineering
and Construction Corporation), with a reputation for being energetic, innovative, and gifted at negotiating and facilitating change (Choi 2005). When elected
in June 2002, Lee promised to improve the problem-ridden public transport sys47
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tem in Seoul. He commissioned a series of comprehensive studies performed by
the research division of SDI. The studies resulted in detailed reports published in
December 2003 recommending coordination and modernization of the metro
and bus fare structures and payment systems, better integration of bus and metro
services, an expanded network of reserved bus lanes, and a complete overhaul
of the organization and operation of bus services (Seoul Development Institute
2003a; 2003b). The transport specialists at SDI, led by Dr. Gyengchul Kim and
Dr. Keeyeon Hwang, were the main technical advocates for these changes, while
Mayor Lee and his staﬀ provided the necessary political support.
Starting in January 2004, the mayor and staﬀ of the Seoul Metropolitan Government conducted an intensive public relations campaign to explain through the
mass media the need for the proposed reforms and the beneﬁts that would result
from them. They also announced the July 1, 2004, start date for implementation
of the reforms (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2004). Since travel conditions in
Seoul had been steadily deteriorating, both for motorists and transit riders, there
was considerable public support for improvements, although not necessarily for
the speciﬁc measures advocated by the mayor and SDI. Thus, much of the media
campaign was focused on explaining and defending the speciﬁc measures to be
implemented.

Bus Services in Seoul After 2004 Reforms
July 1, 2004, marks a milestone in metropolitan Seoul’s transport policies, especially those aﬀecting bus services. Perhaps most important, the Seoul Metropolitan Government greatly increased its control over bus routes, schedules, fares, and
overall system design. It introduced what it calls a “semi-public operation system”
that retains private bus ﬁrms but leaves route, schedule, and fare decisions to the
Seoul Metropolitan Government. Moreover, it now reimburses bus ﬁrms on the
basis of vehicle km of service instead of passenger trips, which should increase
incentives to improve service quality and reduce incentives for speeding, reckless
driving, and discriminating against elderly and disabled passengers (Eum 2005;
Kim, G. 2004; Seoul Development Institute 2003a, b; Seoul Metropolitan Government 2004).
One of the ﬁrst major changes was an entire redesign of the bus route network to
better structure and integrate more than 400 diﬀerent bus routes. All bus services
are now grouped into four types, with buses color-coded to help passengers dis48
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tinguish between them. Blue buses are long-distance express buses that connect
outlying suburbs with each other and with the city center. Red buses are long-distance express buses that connect the satellite cities (planned new towns) with the
city center. Green buses provide local services throughout the metropolitan area
to feed metro stations and express bus stops. Yellow buses provide local services
within the city center (Kwon 2004; Kyung 2004).
To coordinate bus services on a truly comprehensive, systemwide basis, the Seoul
Metropolitan Government set up a new Bus Management System (BMS) using
advanced intelligent transport system (ITS) technology. Global positioning system
(GPS) terminals located in every bus now permit a central bus control center to
monitor all bus locations and speeds, adjust the number of buses assigned to any
given route, communicate with bus drivers, and provide real-time information to
passengers waiting at bus stops or checking bus schedules on the Internet (Seoul
Development Institute 2003a). The new BMS facilitates more dependable, on-time
bus service while also providing better, real-time information for passengers. It also
helps optimize service distribution by adjusting bus assignments and scheduling
to conform better to the diﬀerent travel demands on diﬀerent parts of the extensive bus network.
In addition to the complete redesign of the route network, the system of dedicated bus lanes was expanded and upgraded. The length of curbside bus lanes
was increased from 219 km to 294 km, with more expansions planned. Most signiﬁcant, however, is the development of a true BRT network with dedicated bus
median lanes, high-quality median bus stops, real-time information for passengers
and system operators, and new, state-of-the-art buses. By February 2005, there
were already 36 km BRT services spanning 4 diﬀerent corridors. During 2005 and
2006, there will be an additional 62 km of BRT over 7 more corridors. BRT route
expansion is likely to continue after that. Seoul’s BRT services beneﬁt from an
increasing number of new buses. By 2006, there will be more than 300 low-ﬂoor
buses, mostly running on CNG (compressed natural gas). Of those, about 20 will
be articulated buses. Eventually, all the blue and red express buses will be CNG and
low-ﬂoor, and all red buses will also be articulated. With level boarding platforms
at BRT stops, getting on and oﬀ express buses will be easier, faster, and safer. The
Seoul Metropolitan Government now views BRT as a much cheaper and quicker
way to provide express public transport services than metro expansion, which can
take many years to construct and requires much more capital investment (Seoul
Metropolitan Government 2004).
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Figure 5. Bus Median Lanes
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Nevertheless, the extensive urban and suburban rail lines in Seoul remain the
backbone of Seoul’s public transport system. Thus, it is crucial to better integrate
both local and express bus services with the metro. Bus routes and stops have
already been relocated to facilitate short and easy transfers between the bus and
metro. To further facilitate bus-metro transfers, the city is now constructing 22
major transfer centers that will oﬀer passengers convenient, sheltered bus stations
providing real-time information about metro as well as bus services.
In addition to these major service improvements, the Seoul Metropolitan Government introduced a uniﬁed, coordinated fare structure that integrates both bus
and rail services (Seoul Development Institute 2003b). Fares are now based only
on distance traveled, with free transfers permitted between bus lines as well as
between metro and bus. Although the overall fare level was increased, the distance
zones that had previously only applied to metro fares were enlarged to permit
longer trips without the distance surcharge. Equally important, there is now a
multipurpose, stored-value smart card (called “T-Money”) that can be used for all
bus and rail services, greatly enhancing ease of payment for the traveler. Also, for
the ﬁrst time there are now monthly commutation tickets that oﬀer discounts to
regular travelers.

Impacts of the Reforms
In the weeks immediately after implementation of the July 2004 reforms, there
was great disruption, confusion, and dissatisfaction among passengers. As shown
in Figure 6, more than half of all passengers surveyed in early July were very dissatisﬁed with the changes. Roughly 70 percent said they were dissatisﬁed with the
new fare structure, and about 60 percent were confused about the new bus routes.
The only aspect of bus services that appears to have immediately improved was
the performance of bus drivers, since passenger satisfaction with driver behavior
almost immediately improved on July 1, when the bus reforms came into eﬀect.
As very clearly shown in Figure 6, customer satisfaction dramatically improved in
subsequent weeks and months, as passengers were better informed about the new
bus routes and schedules, and technical problems were worked out with the new
smart card. Overall passenger dissatisfaction fell from a high of 56 percent on July
8 to 44 percent on July 29 and only 13 percent on October 28. Thus, within four
months of the thorough reform of bus services and fares, almost 90 percent of
customers expressed general satisfaction (Seoul Development Institute 2004).
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Figure 6. Decreasing Customer Dissatisfaction with Seoul Bus Reforms over
the Four-Month Period after Their Introduction, from July 1, 2004

Source: Seoul Development Institute 2004.

One reason for the rising customer satisfaction might be the dramatic increase
in bus speeds on BRT corridors (see Figure 7). Between June 2004 and December
2004, average bus speeds doubled in the Dobong-Mia BRT corridor (from 11 to 22
km/hr) and increased by 64 percent and 33 percent in the other two BRT corridors
(Seoul Development Institute 2004). Even more impressive, average bus speeds are
now only slightly lower than average car speeds. Car speeds have also increased in
BRT corridors, since the removal of buses from the general traﬃc has reduced the
disruption caused by buses zigzagging across lanes to and from the curbs to pick
up and drop oﬀ passengers. The greatest improvement in speed, however, has
been for buses, and on average, each BRT median lane now carries six times more
passengers than other lanes in the same corridor.
Bus speeds are likely to rise even further with implementation of Transit Signal
Priority (TSP), which will facilitate bus turns and reduce waiting times for buses
crossing intersections. TSP in Seoul was delayed while waiting for installation and
full functioning of the citywide Transport Operation and Information Service
(TOPIS). Inaugurated in July 2005, this fully computerized system coordinates
roadway traﬃc as well as public transit vehicles, thus permitting the optimization
of traﬃc signals to speed up buses (Korea Times 2005).
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Figure 7. Average Bus and Car Speed Before and After Implementation
of Exclusive Median Bus Lanes

Note: 7-9 A.M., toward city center.
Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005a.

Another beneﬁt of the bus reforms has been an impressive decline in bus-related
accidents and personal injuries. As shown in Figure 8, both the number of bus accidents and the number of personal injuries in bus accidents have fallen by about
a third since implementation of the bus reforms. The improvement in bus safety
may be attributed to better driver performance as well as greater right-of-way
separation for buses in the BRT corridors.
Rising bus passenger levels are perhaps the best indicator of the success of the
reforms (see Figure 9). Only in the ﬁrst month of the reform (July) was the number of bus passengers less than the same month a year earlier (in July 2003) prior
to the reforms. That was due to widespread disruption, confusion, and malfunctions as the new service and fare systems were introduced. By comparison, daily
bus ridership increased by 406,000 passengers per day between September 2003
and September 2004 (+9%) and by 705,000 passengers per day between March
2003 and March 2004 (+14%) (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005b). Metro
ridership remained roughly constant before and after the bus reforms, as shown
in Figure 9.
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Figure 8. Decline in Monthly Bus Accidents and Injuries in Seoul, 2003 to 2005

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005a.

Figure 9. Trends in Average Daily Bus and Metro Passengers
Before and After July 2004 Reforms (in millions)

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005a.
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The new T-money fare collection system permits far more up-to-date monitoring
of passenger levels than ever before. Figure 10 shows average daily bus passenger
levels reported on a week-by-week basis, with only a few days lag, and accessible
on Seoul’s public transport information website (http://bus.go.kr). With the exception of two major holiday periods, when many Seoul residents are on vacation, the
general trend of bus ridership is deﬁnitely upward. From early January to late May
2005, the number of bus passengers rose by almost a million passengers a day—an
increase of about one fourth (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005a).
The reforms appear to have considerably increased overall service quality, but they
have failed to curtail subsidy needs. Indeed, as part of the bus system reorganization, the Seoul Metropolitan Government signed a contractual agreement with
the private bus ﬁrms to cover their full operating deﬁcits. This action has required
an operating subsidy of $135 million in the six-month period after the reforms,

Figure 10. Trends in Average Daily Bus Passengers in Seoul, Week-by-Week,
from Sept. 2004 to July 2005 (in millions)

Source: Seoul Metropolitan Government 2005b.
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which would entail an annual operating subsidy of almost $270 million just for bus
services—almost three times as much as the annual bus subsidy prior to reforms
(Kim, K. 2005).
The sharp increase in bus subsidy needs is alarming, but must be considered in
light of substantial increases in the overall quality of bus services, including new
buses, new shelters at bus stops, and the installation of BRT services to augment
the existing bus services. Moreover, the alternative would be expanding the much
more expensive metro services, which would have required even larger subsidy
increases.
Most of the planned expansion of Seoul’s public transport system involves BRT,
since it is by far the cheapest form of express transit service. Almost everywhere in
the world where BRT has been implemented, it has been only a fraction of the cost
of rail transit. The U.S. General Accounting Oﬃce (2001), for example, estimated
the average construction cost of full-scale BRT (as in Seoul) at about $9.4 million
per km, compared to $23 million per km for Light Rail Transit (LRT) and $87 million per km for metro rail.
Moreover, BRT can be implemented much more quickly than any form of rail transit, and is also far more ﬂexible in terms of adapting to future changes in travel patterns. It has the added beneﬁt of eliminating many transfers, since buses can run
express on the high-speed median lanes and then branch oﬀ into lower density
areas to provide local feeder and distribution service to outlying neighborhoods.

Light Rail Transit Plans
Seoul, like many Korean cities, has tentative plans to build several new LRT lines.
While LRT costs much more than BRT, it cost less than building or extending
metro lines. Park and Han (2003), for example, estimate that the cost of constructing new LRT lines ranges from $20 million to $50 million per km, compared to a
range of $80 million to $100 million for metro lines. For LRT lines that are fully
underground, the cost diﬀerence is much less, however. For example, the LRT line
currently being constructed in the southern Korean port city of Busan is costing
$63 million per km. It is the only LRT line in Korea already under construction.
The proposed underground LRT line in northeastern Seoul would cost $65 million
per km, just about the same as in Busan (Kang 2005). Both of these LRT lines are
cheaper substitutes for previously planned metro extensions. The Seoul Metropolitan Government estimates that the full-scale metro version of the northeastern
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rail line would cost $107 million per km, almost twice as much as the LRT version
of the same line, and more than 10 times as expensive as the per-km cost of BRT.
The planned LRT line in northeastern Seoul is only one of many lines that have
been proposed for Greater Seoul. Not a single line has yet been started, however.
The limiting factor has been insuﬃcient ﬁnancing. In virtually every proposed new
rail project, local and central government oﬃcials are hoping for private investors to ﬁnance at least half the total construction costs. So far, however, private
investors have not come forth with the necessary funding. If they eventually do,
the Korean central government (through the Ministry of Construction and Transportation) and Seoul Metropolitan Government would each bear about a fourth
of the construction cost, provided they both give their oﬃcial approval of each
speciﬁc project.

Conclusions
The path-breaking reforms of July 2004 completely restructured bus services in
Seoul and increased public control over routes, schedules, and other aspects of service. In addition, they integrated bus routes, schedules, and fares with the metro
system, thus providing a far superior overall public transport system. Central to
the reforms was the introduction of an entirely new system of BRT routes, with
fully separate median lanes for express buses.
In the ﬁrst month of the reforms, there was tremendous disruption, confusion,
public discontent, and political uproar. Clearly, more time was needed to ensure
a smooth transition to the completely new bus routes, fare structure, and fare
payment system. In particular, there should have been a trial period to test new
technologies on a selective basis instead of immediately adopting them systemwide. Moreover, the widespread confusion among transit riders indicates that
more time and eﬀort was needed to distribute the appropriate information to the
public before implementing the reforms.
In spite of these temporary, transitional problems, the reforms appear to have
become a huge success. Already by October 2004, almost 90 percent of Seoul residents expressed general satisfaction with the restructured bus services and new
fare system. Average bus speeds increased by 33 percent to 100 percent in the BRT
corridors. Total bus accidents and injuries on all routes combined (express and
local) have fallen by about a third. Month-by-month comparisons of total bus use
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before and after the reforms indicate more than 700,000 additional bus passengers
a day, while metro use has remained just about constant.
The looming ﬁnancial crisis of Seoul’s public transport system was the driving
force behind the drastic reforms of July 2004. Shortage of public funds continues
to force Seoul transport planners and public oﬃcials to seek solutions that are
as cost-eﬀective as possible, providing the best possible service to the most passengers at the lowest possible fares and government subsidies. BRT appears to ﬁt
those requirements better than metro expansions or new LRT lines.
While Seoul can boast a fast, extensive metro system, it cannot aﬀord to expand
it much further, since metro construction debts already greatly burden the Seoul
Metropolitan Government’s ﬁnances. The extension and continual upgrading of
BRT is likely to be the most cost-eﬀective approach to providing the additional
public transport services needed throughout the greater metropolitan area. Studies of existing BRT systems around the world demonstrate that they can provide
excellent express service at a fraction of the cost of new metro construction. The
experience with BRT in Seoul so far has also been a resounding success. Indeed, the
International Association of Public Transport recently honored Mayor Lee and the
Seoul Metropolitan Government with a special award for “extraordinary success
at implementing so many transit reforms in such a short period of time, integrating innovative technologies with new infrastructure” (Kim, T. 2005).
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